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Peripheral Nation-Building in the Socialist Yugoslavia (1945-1974): Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract: The article discusses the emergence and early development of three South-East European nationalisms: Macedonian, Montenegrin and Muslim/Bosniak, all of which were born as mass phenomena only in the second half of the 20th century. The author argues that the first three decades of the socialist Yugoslavia (1945–1974) should be considered crucial to these three nation-building processes because in this period not only the social conditions necessary for the mass production and reception of the modern national ideas were created, but also the respective national cultures were institutionalized, either fully (Macedonian) or partially (Montenegrin, Muslim/Bosniak).

Keywords: Yugoslavia, nationalism, nation-building, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Introduction

This article deals with three nationalisms that were born as mass phenomena only in the second half of the 20th century: Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Muslim/Bosniak. I discuss the process of their gradual emergence during the first three decades of the Yugoslav socialism (1945-1974), when the foundations of those three modern nations have been built. I argue that this period should be understood as crucial for the nation-building processes at the Yugoslav peripheries, where pre-modern religious-regional identifications had previously prevailed, because only then the social conditions necessary for the emergence of those nations were created, and each of the national cultures was institutionalized, either fully (Macedonian) or partially (Montenegrin and Muslim/Bosniak).

My theoretical approach in this article is closest to the political variant of the modernist approach (e.g. Hobsbawm 2010, Malešević 2013, Kilias 2004), which means I understand nationalism as a political process of nation-building driven and largely controlled by institutionalized political action, with historical roots in the nineteenth-century structural disintegration of feudal empires. The article contributes to such a current of sociological and historical research that discusses nationalisms which emerged in Eastern European political space as a late product of its nationalizing (see e.g. Brunnbauer and Grandits 2013; Pivoras 2020; Rudling 2014). This current developed most dynamically in the last decade, after a long period of functioning on the background of scholarly reflection which used to be focused on those nationalisms that entered the historical stage already in the 19th century.

The structure of this article is as follows. First, I present the specificity of the new political position in which all three discussed territories found themselves with the establishment of the SFR Yugoslavia. Next, I show how the mass upward social mobility of the local population during the first decades of socialism created everywhere the structural conditions necessary for the mass production, dissemination, and reception of the national ideas. Finally, I comparatively discuss three nation-buildings: Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Muslim/Bosniak, by looking at how their national cultures were produced and institutionalized.

2. The New Position

The first three decades of the SFR Yugoslavia's existence were crucial for the transformation of the Orthodox population of Macedonia and Montenegro and the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina into modern nations: Macedonians, Montenegrins and Muslims (since 1993: Bosniaks), because only then the structural conditions necessary for the institutionalization and massification of national projects were created in those territories. Prior to that, until the mid-twentieth century, the vast majority of those populations was nationally indifferent and attached to a religious or regional identification characteristic of the late imperial era (see Majewski 2013: 116; Rudometof 2002: 109; Malešević 2007: 702; Bougarel 2009: 120-121). Few local social elites either built the foundations of the respective national ideas confined to their narrow milieus or associated themselves with national projects developed by Serbian nationalists from Belgrade (in all cases), Croatian nationalists from Zagreb (in BiH), or Bulgarian and Greek nationalists from Sofia and Athens (in Macedonia).

The creation of the socialist Yugoslavia marked an unprecedented improvement in the subordinate position of those three territories in regional power relations. Firstly, local political elites experienced a gradual empowerment due to the fact that, with the creation of a strongly centralized Yugoslav state, all three regions acquired the permanent status of federal republics with clear territorial boundaries. This definitely cut off the direct influence of nationalisms from Sofia and Athens and significantly reduced the clout of those from Belgrade and Zagreb. Subsequently, the gradual decentralization of power – which involved the delegation of increasingly broader political powers from the federal center in Belgrade to the capitals of the individual republics and gained momentum in the mid-1960s (Malešević 2006: 157-184) – resulted in the increase of latitude in local branches of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), who became much more active in formulating directions of nation-oriented policies.

Secondly, the central policy of national income redistribution privileging the southern republics, particularly between 1948 and 1965, led to a mass social mobility of the population from the countryside to towns/cities mainly through the expanded state administration and industry. This policy resulted from the LCY Central Committee's strategy according to which the Yugoslav peripheries were to provide a political buffer stabilizing the post-war state by mitigating the antagonism between nationalist Belgrade and Zagreb that had fractured interwar Yugoslavia from within.

3. The New Social Strata

Three main processes show well the structural consequences of mass upward social mobility in all the discussed republics: the dynamics of the urbanization process, changes in the educational structure; transformation of the employment structure. Looking at them enables us to show the magnitude of the modernization leap that transformed those three rural, agricultural populations with very high levels of illiteracy, into modern societies with a relatively diversified social and economic structure, possessing the attributes necessary for the massification of the national ideas. In particular, this involves the existence of: a layer of intellectuals capable of producing the cultural foundations of the nation, i.e. codifying the national language, writing national history and building the national church; a network of institutions and officials/employees ensuring the transmission of national culture in the population; a literate population capable of receiving and internalizing this transmission, i.e. producing a sense of identification with the nation.

The ground for mass upward mobility is presented in the first two tables (Tab. 1; Tab. 2) which show the dynamics of population movement from villages to towns/cities over several postwar decades. It is particularly impressive in the case of small Montenegro, which transformed into an urbanized society by a more than six-fold increase in urban population and a nine-fold increase in population in the capital (Titograd). Against this background, the less spectacular achievements of BiH – a three-and-a-half-fold increase in urban population and a four-fold increase in the population of the capital (Sarajevo) – are worth noting mostly due to the fact that BiH was most populous of all three republics. As for Macedonia, the dynamic development of the capital (Skopje) is particularly noteworthy, since after the war it expanded six-fold even despite the massive earthquake of 1963 that left homeless about one-third of the city's population. The overall dynamics of the urbanization was so high that already in the early 1960s the percentage of the populations living in towns/cities ranged from two-fifths (Montenegro, BiH) to one-third (Macedonia). These numbers show how many people had opportunities for having fairly regular contact with state institutions, that is, the producers and promoters of the respective national cultures.

Tab. 1. The dynamics of urbanization in Yugoslavia, 1948-81.

Urbanization. City population in %:	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981
Yugoslavia – average	16,2	21,7	28,3	38,6	46,5
Macedonia	20,1	26,0	34,9	48,1	53,9
Montenegro	8,3	14,7	21,5	34,2	50,7
BiH	10,8	15,0	19,5	27,9	36,2

Source: Own elaboration based on: Woodward (1995: 385); Myers, Campbell (1954: 31).

Tab. 2. Population growth in the capitals, 1931-81.

Population in the capitals	1931	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981
Skopje	68 334	241 319	287 927	342 827	312 980	408 143
Titograd	10 247	14 369	19 868	35 054	61 727	96 074
Sarajevo	78 173	111 087	127 471	173 144	243 980	319 017

Source: Miljković (1989: 52).

In order to illustrate the scale of change in the educational structure, that accompanied urbanization, its two dimensions are worth pointing at. The first one is the literacy rate increase. In this respect the pre-war populations of all three peripheral republics were far behind two post-Habsburg central republics: Slovenia and Croatia as well as behind the post-Ottoman Serbia proper. The table below (Tab. 3) presents the post-war decline of a drastically high percentage of illiterates which meant a reduction in the distance between the center and the peripheries. While in the 1930s illiteracy in the peripheries covered more than two-thirds of the populations, which placed them significantly below the Yugoslav average, in the early

1960s these proportions reversed. At that time, the literate people, which means: prepared for the reception of national ideas, made up from two-thirds (BiH) to almost four-fifths (Montenegro) of the total population, which placed them close to the Yugoslav average.

Tab. 3. Alphabetization in the Yugoslav republics, 1931-81

Illiteracy in the population over 10 years of age	1931*	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981
Yugoslavia (average)	44,6	26,0	25,4	21,0	15,0	9,5
Macedonia	70,8	39,6	35,7	24,6	13,1	10,9
Montenegro	66	26,4	30,1	21,7	15,7	9,4
BiH	67	44,9	40,2	32,5	23,2	14,5

* Approximate data due to the different administrative shape of Yugoslavia than in subsequent periods.
Source: Own elaboration based on: Andrejka (1938), Bondžić (2010: 103), Katz (2011: 60-61), Klisinski (1974:3), Latifić (1970: 320), Milovanović (1985: 453), Novak (1960: 315-316), Miljković (1989: 39).

The second dimension of educational change is illustrated by the growth of the population with at least secondary education (Tab. 4). It shows the growth of the middle class, that is the social stratum from which codifiers of the national idea (intellectuals, professional politicians, artists), its propagators (teachers, journalists), and institutional guardians (civil servants-administrators) are usually recruited. Although this growth can only be tracked in a standardized way since 1953, omitting the late 1940s does not reduce the scale of this phenomenon. Namely, in all three republics, as early as the beginning of the 1960s, the middle class measured by education level doubled. It means that the stratum of potential producers and propagators of nationalism ranged from 20 000 (Montenegro), through 43 000 (Macedonia), to 70 000 people (BiH). Moreover, by the 1970s this percentage had doubled again, which meant that the middle class had grown to 41 000, 120 000 and 180 000 respectively. These numbers are impressive even in the case of BiH, where the Muslim population was relatively the least privileged of all three national groups living in this republic.

Tab. 4. Growth of the middle class by education, 1953-1981

Population with at least secondary education in%	1953	1961	1971	1981
Yugoslavia (average)	3,18	4,68	9,08	16,40
Macedonia	2,17	4,10	9,34	13,95
Montenegro	3,50	5,57	9,79	18,42
BiH	1,65	2,92	6,19	13,61

Source: Own elaboration based on: Novak (1960: 319), Latifić (1970: 320), Klisinski (1974: 3), Miljković (1989: 360-365).

If we look at the transformation of the employment structure, then, apart from noting the increasingly advanced division of labor, we can grasp the middle class in at least two

ways. Firstly, it can be defined broadly: as the total population employed in the third sector of the economy, i.e. everywhere except agriculture and industry (Tab. 5). In this case it turns out that in all three republics the percentage of such population climbed to the double-digit level already in the early 1950s, and over the next two decades it increased to one-fifth (Macedonia, BiH) or even one-fourth (Montenegro) of the total workforce. Secondly, we can narrow down the definition of the middle class to public administration employees and professionals only (Tab. 6). In this case it turns out that the middle class exceeded the double-digit percentage a decade (Macedonia, Montenegro) or two decades (BiH) later. Even with a narrower definition, however, the layer of potential 'producers' of nationalism is at least twice as large as that measured by the education level. Its size at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s was, respectively, 42,5/70 000 (Montenegro), 119/187 000 (Macedonia) and 173,5/348 000 (BiH) people.

Tab. 5. Transformation of the employment structure, 1953-1981

Employment structure by economic sectors in % workforce	1953			1961			1971			1981		
	1st	2nd	**3rd**	1st	2nd	**3rd**	1st	2nd	**3rd**	1st	2nd	**3rd**
Yugoslavia (average)	70,0	16,1	**13,0**	59,7	23,0	**17,3**	48,7	28,7	**21,6**	28,7	33,6	**37,7**
Macedonia	72,4	14,9	**12,7**	62,4	20,9	**16,7**	49,9	29,0	**21,1**	32,1	33,8	**34,1**
Montenegro	70,6	14,4	**15,0**	58,0	21,5	**20,5**	46,5	26,2	**27,4**	17,3	35,0	**47,7**
BiH	73,0	15,9	**11,1**	63,8	21,3	**14,9**	52,6	28,2	**19,2**	25,7	39,0	**35,3**

Source: Own elaboration based on: Breznik (1974: 63), Miljković (1989: 51).

Tab. 6. Growth of the middle class by employment, 1953-1981

Workforce employed as public administrators and professionals in%	1953	1961	1971	1981
Yugoslavia (average)	7,40	10,50	14,50	22,40
Macedonia	7,50	11,40	14,50	20,10
Montenegro	8,90	12,10	16,80	27,70
BiH	5,80	7,30	12,0	20,30

Source: Own elaboration based on: Novak (1960: 317; 1962: 318), Latifić (1973: 352); Miljković (1989: 51).

In short, the first fifteen years of the socialist policy brought about a fundamental structural change in the Yugoslav peripheries, i.e. Macedonia, Montenegro and BiH, which created the conditions necessary for the massification of their national ideas at the beginning of the 1960s. Already then, the populations of all three republics can be considered moderately urbanized societies in which illiteracy was relatively rare, i.e. the majority of the population was capable of receiving the national culture; the role of cities has become significant, i.e. the potential influence of the nation-building institutions on the masses increased significantly; the middle class, that is, the layer of producers and propagators of

nationalism, was large enough to supply these institutions and operate in them. In the following decades all these trends deepened.

4. The New Policies

Despite similar structural conditions, the political dynamics of the three discussed nationalisms were highly different in 1945-74, and there were disparities within each of them between their three key dimensions, which I discuss below: the codification of a national language, national history-writing and national church-building. These disparities resulted both from the strong dependence of the peripheries on the broader political interests of the Yugoslav federal center of power in Belgrade, and from diverse positions of local elites in "their own" republics. The first factor resulted primarily in a two-speed nationalist policies, i.e. the dynamic flourishing of Macedonian nationalism and the slow, hindered development of the other two. The second factor resulted in a different internal configuration of each nationalism.

4.1. The first speed: Macedonian nationalism

The main reason for the early, strong support of the federal center of power for Macedonian nationalism was the strive for solving the so-called Macedonian question which for the previous several decades had fueled the regional struggle of three state nationalisms: Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek, for control over the entire geographical Macedonia, including Vardar Macedonia with its capital in Skopje. To this end, the federal center planned to invalidate Bulgarian and Greek territorial claims by transforming the sense of identification with 'Macedonianness' as a loose regional label, that had been prevalent among local Slavs, into identification with 'Macedonianness' as a national category fulfilled with concrete cultural content. Therefore, Macedonian nation-building began as early as the end of the war and developed on a full scale by the mid-1960s, which was unique in Yugoslavia since during the first two postwar decades the federal center strived for building a common, quasi-universal Yugoslav culture designed to transcend particularistic nationality policies (see Wachtel 1998: 130-172).

Therefore, at a time when well-established nationalisms (such as Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian) were marginalized and less developed ones (such as Montenegrin and Muslim/Bosniak) were ignored, nationalism flourished in mainstream Macedonian politics. The first-ever codification act of the Macedonian linguistic standard, i.e. a norm containing an alphabet along with an outline of orthographic and grammatical rules, was adopted and

publicly announced as early as the summer of 1945 in *Nova Makedonija* daily, while nationalist historiography was institutionalized three years later with the creation of the *Institute of National History in Skopje* (1948). The first post-war generation of Macedonian scholars – particularly linguists (with Blaže Koneski) and historians (with Blaže Ristovski), as well as folklorists and others – quickly staffed the newly established institutions-guardians of national identity that in 1949 united into the *University of St. Cyril and Methodius* in Skopje.

An important consequence of launching the local nation-building process in the centralized state was Belgrade's continued influence on the shape of Macedonian nationalism, secured by personnel purges in the Communist Party of Macedonia during Yugoslav Stalinism (1945-48) (Marinov 2010: 4). The dispute between the centralist and localist factions is best illustrated by the developments of language policy, where it was articulated already during the codification of the standard language, as a conflict between pro-Belgrade supporters of "Serbianization" and pro-Skopje supporters of nativization of the language norm, the latter meaning its "Bulgarianization" (Friedman 2000: 172, Majewski 2013: 121-122). The initial predominance of the former faction was to result in the Serbianization of the Macedonian Cyrillic alphabet, in which 28 out of 31 letters became identical to the Serbian alphabet after the centralists introduced four characters borrowed directly from the Serbian Cyrillic and prevented the localists to preserve some characters grounded in local tradition.

The Serbianization of the Macedonian language norm was even tightened after the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, as a response to the active contestation of the new norm by an external, pro-Bulgarian opposition, supported by an anti-Yugoslav Moscow and recruited from Slavic communist refugees from Aegean Macedonia who escaped Greece during the civil war (Voss 2006: 125-126). This wave of Serbianization lasted until the beginning of the de-Stalinization process in the USSR and influenced e.g. textbooks from the first half of the 1950s, especially the first comprehensive Macedonian orthography (1951) by Blaže Koneski and Krum Tošev. In turn, the pro-Skopje localists strengthened their position towards the end of this decade, which was to manifest most clearly in the strive for lexical nativization in the multi-volume *Dictionary of the Macedonian Language* (ed. B. Koneski) published in 1961-66 (Ibid.). Although the proponents of pro-Serbian centralism never again regained such a strong position in Macedonian language policy, it should be noted that they exerted a strong influence on the national language at a crucial stage of its institutionalization.

Such disputes resounded less in nationalist historiography, where the voice of historians sent from Belgrade tended to resonate better with the voice of local scholars against an external opponent. In fact, historians developed a narrative of the Macedonian national past

that, due to its strongly anti-Bulgarian and anti-Greek overtones, aroused strong resistance from Athens and Sofia. More precisely, the Macedonian historians took two main measures that actually mirrored the measures taken from the late 19th century onwards by both neighboring historiographies: they captured cornerstones of the neighboring narratives by inscribing it into their own national narrative, and they placed at the center of their own narrative the whole geographical Macedonia, i.e. also the territories controlled at that time by Athens and Sofia (Roudometof 2002: 61; Voss 2006: 123).

Both endeavors began in the 1950s and they first addressed the nineteenth-century origins of autonomous Macedonian nation-building activity. The historians claimed it had begun, on the one hand, during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-78 which resulted, among other things, in the independence of Bulgaria, and, on the other hand, during the Greek War of Independence of 1821-32. The mature Macedonian nation-building activity was found in the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO, est. 1893) – a secret society of conspirators dominated by Bulgarian nationalists who largely originated and operated in Greek Macedonia – while the VMRO-inspired, defeated, anti-Ottoman Ilinden Uprising (2 Aug 1903) was considered a prelude to the creation of the Socialist Macedonia (2 Aug 1944, Majewski 2013: 199-202). In the following decade, the Macedonian national narrative was rooted even deeper in the past: on the one hand, in the Middle Ages, where the ethnogenesis of Macedonians was traced back to Saints Cyril and Methodius, previously recognized by Sofia as the foundation of 'Bulgarianness', and, on the other hand, in the antiquity – where it was supposed to begin with Alexander of Macedon, inscribed by Athens in the foundations of 'Greekness'. The four-volume *History of the Macedonian Nation* (ed. Mihailo Apostolski) published in 1966-70, i.e. when the Montenegrin and Muslim/Bosniak nationalisms just began to emerge, symbolically concluded the process of Macedonian national narrative-shaping. In the institutional sense, this process closed with the establishment of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (1967).

Against the background of the high dynamics of linguistic and historical policies, the national church-building proceeded relatively slowly, since the Ohrid Bishopric – the main initiator of granting the autocephalous status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MPC) to Orthodox parishes located on the territory of the SR Macedonia – found itself in a long-term clinch between the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) and the federal Belgrade, caused by the two-track religious policy of the latter. More precisely, until the mid-1960s, the federal center, on the one hand, supported the development of 'small churches' to legitimize LCY's rule among the clergy, while on the other hand, it hindered the functioning of the two largest

national churches: the Croatian Catholic Church and the SPC, thus intensifying the hierarchy's opposition to the authorities (Perica 2002: 26). Hence, after 1945, the autonomist aspirations of the Ohrid Bishopric, that was hitherto under SPC's jurisdiction, moved forward with difficulties and strong resistance from the Serbian Patriarch and the Holy Synod. However, some important achievements should be noted, such as the right to celebrate mass in Macedonian or the establishment of the office of the Macedonian Metropolitan in the late 1950s (Belyakova 2014: 73-78).

The Macedonian clergy emerged from this clinch only in 1967, using the support of the Macedonian LCY branch that had been strengthened in result of the Yugoslav-wide decentralization of power, to unilaterally declare the MPC's autocephaly from SPC. This act should be considered the moment when the Macedonian national church was officially constituted, all the more so because it marked the beginning of an open, long-standing conflict between the two churches, which on each side fueled a dynamic policy of building new churches, opening seminaries and theological schools. As noted by Perica (2002: 146), in a decade-and-a-half after the MPC's declaration of 'independence', its structure grew from one diocese to eight (including two foreign ones), and the Macedonian clergy grew into more than two hundred parishes and one hundred open monasteries.

4.2. The second speed: Montenegrin and Muslim/Bosniak nationalisms

The Montenegrin and Muslim/Bosniak nationalisms differed from the Macedonian one mostly in the way national cultures were produced, while the institutional autonomization of all three territories, both formal (gaining the status of Yugoslav republics) and practical (gaining agency by the local communists), went very similarly. It seems that the lack of support from the federal center for both nation-oriented initiatives was mostly due to the lack of external territorial claims on Montenegro and BiH, since both republics were located, unlike Macedonia, far from the disputed state borders.

Moreover, their situation was more complicated due to disagreements in the LCY's Central Committee about the nature of the collective identification of the Montenegrin Orthodox and the Bosnian Muslim populations, which resulted from their complex historical links with Serbian nationalism from Belgrade. More precisely, the federal center did not support Montenegrin national identification due to a widespread belief that it was merely a regional variant of 'Serbness'. This position was prevalent even among prominent Montenegrin communists, which testifies for the effectiveness of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Serbian nationalist policy that placed in the center of Serbian national

culture all modern history and culture produced on the Montenegrin territory. Emblematic of this position is the just-post-war thesis of Milovan Đilas, the LCY Central Committee member of Montenegrin origin, that *Montenegrins are the purest and best among Serbs, and that Montenegro is the cradle of Serbness* (after Domachowska 2019: 147). This position became the long-lasting foundation for the passivity of the federal center towards Montenegrin nation-building.

The same lack of support for Muslim/Bosniak identification stemmed from the disputes within LCY – including Muslim/Bosniak communists themselves – as to what national category the Bosnian Muslims were actually supposed to identify with (Hoare 2013: 353-362). These disputes were a legacy of the unsteadiness of Muslim/Bosniak elites in previous decades, when, due to having been subjected to the expansive policies of Vienna/Budapest, Belgrade and Zagreb, they were torn between several national identifications (the post-imperial Bosniak, the interwar Yugoslav, Serbian, Croatian) and a religious one (Muslim) (see Rawski 2019: 49-91). Moreover, the Muslim population did not constitute a demographic majority in BiH, sharing this republic with the most numerous Bosnian Serbs and the least numerous Bosnian Croats. Those factors put the Muslim/Bosniak nationalists in a particularly difficult position as they did not have a formal status of the Yugoslav nation, did not agree on the main direction of their nation-building policy, nor did they have their exclusive nation-building institutions.

For these reasons, the Montenegrin and Muslim/Bosniak nationalisms remained weak and scattered for a long time, and once they entered the mainstream local politics in the wake of the all-Yugoslav power decentralization in the mid-1960s, their scope was still much more modest than in Macedonia. In both cases, a relatively most developed dimension was the historical policy initiated by the local LCY leaderships. In Montenegro, the flagship historiographical project commissioned and coordinated by the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Montenegro (LCM) was the multi-volume *History of Montenegro* developed in close cooperation with historians from the local *Historical Institute* (est. 1948) and Serbian historians from Belgrade (Dulović 2009: 8-9). On this occasion, a conflict quickly arose between pro-Belgrade supporters of the Serbianization of Montenegro's history and pro-Titograd supporters of its nativization, which resembled the 1940s Macedonian dispute over the national language norm.

The key difference, however, was the much stronger institutional position of the Montenegrin communists, which enabled them, in 1970, to counter the efforts of the centralists and block the whole project and later force them to adjust their course to the

official political line of the LCM (Dulović 2009: 9-12). The first action involved support for the nativist position, whose adherents (e.g. Savo Brković) preferred a strongly nationalist vision of the past, according to which the Montenegrin people had been a monolith since the deep Middle Ages who had hardened their identity in the centuries-long struggle against the Serbs for the independence of Montenegro. The second action was an attempt to soften this direction, too radical even for the loosened framework of Yugoslav nationality policy of the early 1970s. From here a moderate position emerged, according to which work on Montenegrin history and national culture was to be carried out taking into account the assumption of the overarching brotherhood of Yugoslav nations. However, since in practice this meant freezing work on the disputed history of nineteenth-century Montenegro, this eventual eight-volume project was shut down after the third volume had already been published (Ibidem). Nevertheless, the early 1970s in Montenegro mark the beginning of the institutionalization of both radical and moderate positions on Montenegrin nation-building and pro-Serbian positions in the then newly established institutions, especially the University of Titograd (1974) and the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts (1973).

In the case of BiH, historical policy was important for the Muslim/Bosniak communists because it was one of their main tools used to settle the dispute over the name of the national identification of the Bosnian Muslims in favor of the so-called capital "M" policy. It was a mainstream-moderate position, according to which the Bosnian Muslims were to be granted the status of a Yugoslav nation under the name: "Muslims" – capitalized "M" to distinguish them from other Yugoslav Muslims as a religious group. The work to implement this policy, that Muslim communists and party intellectuals had undertaken since the early 1960s, proceeded along two tracks. On the one hand, during the flagship historiographical project, funded by the League of Communists of BiH (LCBiH) and implemented at the *Faculty of Political Science* and the *Historical Institute* of the University of Sarajevo, the first narrative about the Muslim national past was worked out (Lučić 2012: 27). On the other hand, work was being done to neutralize the internal opposition of Serbian and Croatian members of the tri-national LCBiH Central Committee. At the turn of the 1960s and the 1970s these efforts brought more pronounced results than in Montenegro. More precisely, in February 1968, the LCBiH Central Committee officially recognized the Muslim nation (Kamberović 2009: 294), a year later the key historiographical work was published (*National and Political Development of Muslims* by Atif Purivatra), and in 1971 the category "Muslim in the national sense" appeared for the first time in the Yugoslav census, gaining mass support among the Bosnian Muslims.

However, the capital "M" policy was based on two paradoxes from which three alternative nationalist positions emerged (Rawski 2019: 70-74). Firstly, despite promoting an explicitly religious national label, the Muslim/Bosniak communists were oriented towards producing Muslim national culture from secular content only. In opposition to this tendency the position of cultural particularism arose, whose proponents (mainly literary scholars, e.g. Alija Isaković) called for blurring the boundary between the secular and the religious in the work on national culture, and for emphasizing the longstanding cultural separateness of Muslims from Serbs and Croats. Secondly, despite the assumption of limiting the territorial scope of the Muslim nation to BiH, the communists did not grant it a privileged status in the republic, but emphasized the equal right of all three nations to the entire territory of BiH. This resulted in the emergence of an all-Bosnian position, whose proponents (e.g. Enver Redžić) proposed a vision of BiH as an integral territorial and cultural entity irreducible to the sum of the three national particularisms, thus implicitly advocating Bosnian national identification as superior to them. Finally, the third position was represented by the Muslim political émigré in Switzerland, headed by Adil Zulfikarpašić, who rejected the whole capital "M" policy and advocated the model of BiH as a typical liberal nation-state inhabited by a single Bosniak nation. Although, nominally, one Bosniak nation was to consist of three religious components, in practice this milieu granted a dominant position to the Muslim population (Lučić 2012: 39). In short, in the Muslim/Bosniak case, unlike in the Montenegrin one, the early 1970s brought about four alternative nationalist positions, none of which were pro-Serbian. The main sites of their uneven institutionalization until 1974 were some faculties of the University of Sarajevo: the Faculty of Political Science (est. 1961), the Oriental Institute (est. 1962) and the Institute of Language (est. 1972), and to some extent the Academy of Sciences and Arts of BiH (est. 1966).

In language and religious policy, both nationalisms developed equally modestly. Activities in the former area were sparked in the mid-1960s by the crisis of the common Serbo-Croatian language that had been renewed a decade earlier by Croatian and Serbian linguists with the general approval of scholars from all republics. This crisis initiated a tendency in Yugoslav linguistics to emphasize functional distinctiveness of Serbian and Croatian languages as actually existing variants of an abstract common standard, and on this wave the existence of Bosnian and Montenegrin language variants also began to be mentioned (Dulović 2013: 171). However, since the crisis in linguistics was a manifestation of a broader political crisis between Belgrade and Zagreb, its escalation in the early 1970s triggered the intervention of the federal center and purges in the party leaderships of both republics.

Therefore, the local Central Committees in Montenegro and BiH did not support radical circles promoting autonomist linguistic theses: in BiH the cultural particularists of Isaković (Okey 2005: 434) and in Montenegro the radicals of Brković (Dulović 2013: 174-176). Although, ultimately, the existence of both language variants was approved on the initiative of the federal center a few years later, this fact did not trigger any significant codification efforts until the turn of the 1980s and 1990s.

As for the religious policy, its direction in both republics was determined by loyalty of both local party leaderships and the highest hierarchies of both major religious institutions to the federal center. However, this loyalty had the opposite effect to that of the Macedonian case. On the one hand, the few voices in favor of autonomy for the Montenegrin Orthodox Church were ignored, lacking unequivocal support even from the Montenegrin Central Committee (Zdravkovski, Morrison 2014: 250-251). This is because it was not in the interest of the federal center to open another conflict with the leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which had also exercised control over Montenegrin parishes. The completely marginal role of the autonomist clergy in this republic is well illustrated by the events surrounding the construction of the new mausoleum of Petar II Petrović Njegoš, the most important 19th century ruler of Montenegro, who was buried on Mount Lovćen near Cetinje. Despite the fact that, at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, the long-time Metropolitan of Montenegro, Daniel, protested vehemently against the demolition of the Orthodox chapel on Lovćen and the transfer of Njegoš's ashes to the secular mausoleum erected in its place, he at the same time advocated the unbreakable bond between Montenegrin parishes and the SPC (Stamatović 1999).

On the other hand, the federal center was keen to maintain institutional unity among all Yugoslav Muslims, who they brought together in a single religious institution: the Islamic Community (IC) that since the late 1940s had been divided into four administrative units (Sarajevo, Pristina, Skopje, Titograd) equipped with similar powers (Ramet 2002: 119). At the turn of the 1960 and 1970s, the Bosnian Muslim clergy in Sarajevo made their respect for this structure clear by becoming heavily involved in promoting the capital "M" policy that did not envisage a separate religious organization for BiH. Such a position guaranteed the IC the support of the federal center, which secured its institutional growth. As noted by Perica (2002: 78-79) and Ramet (2002: 120), in the 1970s eight hundred new places of Islamic worship were opened throughout the country, while in BiH alone the number of mosques increased to over a thousand; new religious schools, including the Faculty of Islamic Studies, were opened; the religious journal *Preporod* was launched (1970). One of the reasons the

latter organ was important was that it helped the marginal radical pan-Islamists of the Young Muslims organization, headed by Alija Izetbegovic, survive in an unfavorable political system unfavorable (Bougarel, Rashid 1997: 542). This is important, of course, because this milieu will play a key political role in the Muslim/Bosniak nationalism of the early 1990s.

5. Conclusions

All three Yugoslav republics: Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, experienced similar post-war dynamics of structural socio-economic transformations, which already in the early 1960s resulted in the creation of the foundations of modern, urbanized, literate, educated societies capable of mass production and reception of national cultures. Nevertheless, the political dynamics of the individual Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Muslim/Bosniak nationalisms were significantly different due to the different political interests of the Yugoslav center in the various republics, the different dynamics of the overall political system in particular periods, and the different positioning of local elites in the republican power structures.

The main difference can be made between the Macedonian nationalism and the other two cases. While the most dynamic development of Macedonian nationalism occurred in the first two postwar decades and resulted, by the end of the 1960s, in a virtually complete institutionalization of Macedonian national culture, the development of Montenegrin and Muslim/Bosniak nationalism in the 1960s had just begun, and peaked already in the early 1970s, which led to only partial institutionalization of both national cultures. To be specific, in the Macedonian case the language standard was fully codified, the coherent narrative about the national past was produced, and the independent national church was built. Meanwhile, in the Montenegrin and Muslim/Bosniak cases, it was mainly historiography and literary studies that developed and began to institutionalize a few positions on the national question: three Montenegrin (pro-Serbian and moderately and radically pro-Montenegrin) and four Muslim/Bosniak (the capital "M" position, cultural particularism, an all-Bosnian position, and a neo-Bosniak position). The language policy in both cases was hinted at but not developed, and the autonomy of national churches was of marginal importance.

Doubtlessly then, the first three decades of Yugoslav socialism (1945-74) should be considered a crucial stage in the development of all three nationalisms: Macedonian, Montenegrin and Muslim/Bosniak. Despite the differences between them, in each case this period resulted not only in the preparation of the population for the massification of the national idea, but also in the emergence and at least partial institutionalization of all the most

important nationalist positions that would play key political roles in the break-up of Yugoslavia and the establishment of new independent states: Macedonia (1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Montenegro (2006).

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